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Abstract. The paper examines enterprises' motives for participating in 
infrastructure and social service provision in the Russian Federation. 
This common practice of the socialist era is still widely in operation 
among large and medium sized Russian firms. Using a stylized model 
we show that this activity can be largely related to firms' efforts to 
increase their operational reliability. A unique survey data shows that 
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employee attachment, and better relations to authorities. Furthermore, 
physical and institutional heritage play a major role in firms’ activities.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Since the financial crisis of 1998 Russia’s economy has been on path of previously unseen 
growth led by constantly increasing global energy prices. After the turbulent 1990s, the 
social and institutional conditions have stabilized during the presidency of Vladimir Putin. 
However, long term sustainable growth can not hang solely on energy prices and its 
positive externalities in the economy. The World Bank’s World Development Report 
2004 entitled “Making Services Work for the Poor” views efficient public service delivery 
as key ingredient for economic growth and poverty eradication. Firms’ incentives to 
invest are reduced if their access to e.g. electricity is subject to daily blackouts – i.e., if its 
operational reliability is weak. The same concerns also labour: basic deficiencies in 
services such as health care and primary education reduce the quality of the labour force 
thus increasing labour costs and reducing productivity. Furthermore, citizens’ inadequate 
access to daily necessities can create social imbalances in the society. 
 
In Soviet Union, firms were a tool of carrying out the state’s plans. The system hoped to 
reap economies of scale by designating certain localities to specialize in the production of 
a small variety of goods in large plants. In these localities, nearly everyone was employed 
by the single, large producer. The large firms were often assumed to participate in local 
infrastructure provision, e.g. energy and heat supply, as well as social service provision 
including housing, medical and day care. After the collapse of the Soviet system, some 
enterprises continued to supply public services and to maintain the local infrastructure. 
Majority of social assets had been shifted under municipal ownership by the end of 1997 
(Leksin and Shvetsov 1998, Commander and Schankerman 1997). Major shift of 
responsibility has also occurred in the sphere of infrastructure. However, more than ten 
years after the law on divestiture of enterprises social assets, we still see remnants of the 
socialist system in modern Russia’s firm activity (Haaparanta et al. 2003). Big industrial 
enterprises still provide social services and produce or support local infrastructure goods 
(this activity is referred as infrasoc participation henceforth).  
 
Traditionally, explanations for the rationale of corporate social responsibility (CSR) vary 
from managers’ altruism to firm reputation and strategy for differentiation (see 
 2
McWilliams et al., 2006, for a survey). Based on earlier companion papers1 as well as on 
our new results, we argue that in Russia the seemingly altruistic infrasoc participation - as 
a form of corporate social responsibility2 - can be reduced to a fully rational response by 
the enterprise sector to an unreliable operational environment. Naturally, whatever the 
benefits from infrasoc provision are, inherited physical facilities make the costs of 
providing it considerably smaller. Furthermore, a decades old practice within the society 
is not easily altered, especially as the public sector is poorly equipped to assume the 
responsibility of providing infrasoc services to the population. Thus both physical and 
institutional inheritance unquestionably has a role to play.  
 
Our major argument is that firms are using infrasoc provision to maximize their 
operational reliability through various channels. Firstly, contributing to municipal 
infrastructure makes supply of it to the firm more reliable. Secondly, providing social 
services to workers in a surrounding where public provision of them is in weak shape, 
enables firms to attach their workers more strongly thus avoiding potential production 
problems after staff leave. Thirdly, we argue that infrasoc provision enhances relations 
between the firm and public sector which benefits firms through friendlier regulatory 
environment. We will present a theoretical model of firm optimization in an environment 
where it can affect its operational reliability through engagement in infrasoc provision. 
We find empirical evidence supporting many features the model poses.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some descriptive data on 
the infrasoc provision of our sample firms and gives more background to the phenomenon 
as well as  explains our hypotheses more thoroughly. Section 3 presents our model of firm 
optimization in an uncertain environment. In Section 4 we describe our data and empirical 
methodology, Section 5 presents our empirical evidence and Section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                 
1 Juurikkala and Lazareva (2006a, 2006b), Solanko (2006) and Haaparanta et al. (2003) use the same survey 
data set. 
2 CSR has been defined e.g. as follows “actions on the part of the firm that appear to advance the promotion 
of some social good beyond the immediate interest of the firm or shareholders and beyond legal 
requirements” (McWilliams and Siegel (2001). 
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2. EXPLAINING FIRMS’ INFRASOC PROVISION IN RUSSIA 
In this section, we shed more light on the history of Russian firms’ infrasoc provision as 
well as provide descriptive information from our survey data set. Following Reinikka and 
Svensson (2002), complementary capital can be defined as capital that provides support 
services necessary for the operation of productive private capital. Especially in low- and 
medium-income countries, complementary capital (e.g. transport infrastructure or utilities) 
is typically provided by state monopolies or publicly owned companies. To some degree, 
a firm can substitute for mediocre public services by investing privately in complementary 
capital (e.g. private electric power generators). Poor infrastructure and deficient public 
services have, indeed, lately received more attention in the economic literature as well as 
in policy discussions (World Bank 2004). 
 
In Russia, infrastructure provision by enterprises has its roots in the planning of Soviet 
cities. A standardized model of Soviet municipal infrastructure, whereby a city of a 
certain size is linked to a certain number of electric power and heating plants, emerged as 
a by-product of central planning. The heating and power plants, as well as the other 
infrastructure, would be operated either by the city or by individual enterprises according 
to the plan (Hill and Gaddy 2003). In Russia, the crisis following the breakdown of the 
Soviet system in the beginning of 1990s led also to deterioration of the publicly provided 
infrastructure and social goods. There have not been enough funds to replace the public 
capital at rate of its physical depreciation. In addition to insufficient funds, also 
ambiguous property rights have partly led to poor maintenance of these facilities 
(Juurikkala and Lazareva 2006a). As a result, Russia has a low rating in infrastructure 
quality (EBRD 2004). This is also visible in our survey data3 showing that firms in Russia 
have to operate in an environment where interruptions in basic infrastructure delivery 
cause serious problems for production (see Table 1).  
 
 
                                                 
3 See Section 4  for the survey description. 
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                          Table 1.  Interruptions in basic infrastructure in 2002 
 
 
Industry 
% of firms that have 
experienced 
interruptions 
Of those: % that regard 
the interruptions as 
significant 
Mean / median 
length of 
interruptions, days 
Electricity 38.6 48.8 7.3 / 2 
Water 30.0 32.0 8.1 / 3 
Telephone 30.9 39.1 8.6 / 5 
Gas 10.5 39.1 18.1 / 3 
Heating 10.2 30.4 12.5 / 7 
 
Even in today’s Russia large enterprises are critically important in some areas of 
infrastructure provision. This is the case in e.g. heat provision where enterprises often 
continue to be the monopoly heat provider for the apartment blocks it used to own or for a 
whole district Solanko (2006). Besides producing own heat or electricity, many firms 
support public infrastructure construction or maintenance financially or otherwise (see 
Tables 2-4 for descriptive figures). Our survey data shows that larger firms in employment 
terms are more likely to produce heat and especially electricity. Depending on firm size 
class, from one third up to sixty percent of sample firms are engaged in infrastructure 
provision somehow. There are also industry wide differences in infrastructure production. 
While most of firms in each industry produce heat, only in energy and fuel, steel and iron, 
and forestry and paper industries considerable amount of firms produce electricity. This is 
related to the production processes and size of firms in those industries. Excluding light 
industry (textiles etc.), firms are prominently involved in transport infrastructure provision 
(see Table 4).  
 
Table 2. Firms support to construction or maintenance of municipal infrastructure 
 
 
Form of municipal 
infrastructure 
% of firms giving 
financial support to 
maintenance or 
construction of 
% of firms giving 
non-financial 
support to 
maintenance or 
construction of 
% of firms 
giving either 
form of 
support 
If firm owns 
necessary 
facilities, % of 
firms giving either 
form of support 
Municipal heating 10.9 10.2 16.6 18.0 
Municipal electricity 7.7 7.7 11.9 11.1 
Railroads not owned by firm 5.5 4.2 7.7 12.2 
Local gas network 6.5 4.2 8.4 na 
Municipal water system 10.6 9.4 17.3 na 
Municipal waste collection 10.9 7.7 15.4 na 
Roads outside plant area 19.9 10.4 24.1 na 
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                      Table 3. Infrastructure production and support by firm size 
Percentage of firms:     
Number of 
employees Producing 
heat 
Producing 
electricity 
Owning 
rail cars 
Supporting 
road network 
Supporting 
heating 
network 
Supporting 
any form of 
infrastructure
<500 72.9 1.4 11.4 27.1 17.1 44.3 
500-800 67.7 4.6 20.0 17.7 11.5 39.2 
800-1500 78.7 3.7 24.1 21.3 14.8 37.0 
1500-5000 87.8 2.7 43.2 29.7 24.3 50.0 
>5000 80.0 25.0 70.0 45.0 30.0 60.0 
 
                       Table 4. Infrastructure production and support by industry 
Industry 
% of firms 
producing 
heat 
% of firms 
producing 
electricity 
% of firms 
owning rail 
cars 
% of firms 
supporting road 
network 
Power and fuel 80.0 40.0 100 20.0 
Iron and steel 81.8 22.7 100 45.5 
Chemicals 66.7 3.7 75.0 37.0 
Machinery 66.7 0.0 37.9 20.6 
Forestry, paper 86.1 11.1 88.9 36.1 
Construction materials 80.0 4.4 66.7 22.2 
Light industry (textiles etc.) 68.2 0.0 0.0 11.4 
Food processing 93.3 6.7 37.5 25.0 
Other 54.2 0.0 25.0 16.7 
 
 
Similar history concerns also social services provision. Basic legal documents that 
required divestiture of housing and the bulk of social assets within six months after the 
privatization of a firm were adopted in 1992-1993. Instead of immediate privatization, the 
assets were divested to the local authorities, who then became responsible for the 
provision of the services. It has to keep in mind, however, that the social assets embedded 
in the firms were never legally in the firms’ ownership. During the mass privatization in 
the early 1990s, these assets were under the federal ownership and were transferred under 
municipal ownership. During this process the local authorities had considerable negotia-
ting powers. Transferring the ownership of enterprises social assets’ was supposed to be 
finished by the end of 1997 and that goal was almost completed. Some 80% of housing 
stock, kindergartens, medical services, sports facilities and children’s summer camps 
coupled with some 60 - 70% of recreation facilities were shifted under municipal 
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ownership in 1993-1997. The variation between regions, and especially between 
municipalities, was however very large, as the share of municipalized assets might vary 
between 15% and 100% (see Juurikkala and Lazareva 2006a).  
 
Our survey data, however, show that the large industrial firms still provide a wide array of 
social services or continue to finance them despite the divestiture process. There are also 
substantial differences across the interviewed firms and different types of assets in how 
fast and to what extent divestiture has taken place. Furthermore, many of the firms have 
no intention of divesting all their assets. Rather they intend to invest in the package of 
fringe benefits they provide to their employees (and in many cases also to users outside 
the firm). Over 90 % of the surveyed firms had at least some kind of social assets in 1990, 
and over 90 % still provided or supported at least one service in 2003, though the scale of 
the firms’ participation in social service provision has diminished significantly during the 
last decade. Interestingly, every sixth of the surveyed firms had in their balance housing 
facilities built after the collapse of the Soviet regime. It is also striking that in over a half 
of the firms that offer housing, users are not just employees and their families (see Table 
5). Furthermore, according to our survey, despite the fact that many firms receive some 
payment for the provided social services, virtually every firms’ business manager’s view 
is that none of the social asset provision is profitable to the firm.  
 
                     Table 5.  Firms’ social service provision (managers’ view) 
Percentage of firms having 
provisions 
Housing Medical care Daycare Recreation Other  At least one 
1990 78.5 76.7 69.8 38.2 84.4 94.6 
2002  (assets built after 1990) 15.1 na 2.0 4.7 17.6 32.4 
Have or provide support in 
2002  55.7 90.8 26 73.3 76.5 97.8 
Have on balance 34.2 67.1 10.4 20.8 76.5 91.8 
Support assets transferred 
to municipality 5.0 4.0 6.7 0.3 na 14.1 
Direct financial aid to 
employees 22.0 42.1 8.9 58.7 na 76.2 
Other form of support 11.4 8.2 3.0 4.5 na 22.0 
Of  those giving any support, 
users not only employees and 
their families 
55.6 38.7 41.9 29.4 na 62.3 
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What are the rationales for continued engagement in infrasoc provision? Firstly, the 
necessary infrasoc capital  - as major share of other capital as well - of Russian firms is 
largely inherited from the Soviet era when it was constructed to serve possibly the whole 
locality. Thus, a major physical and institutional heritage has occurred (see Solanko, 2006, 
for more discussion). The answers of the interviewed general managers interviewed give 
plenty of anecdotic evidence on the institutional heritage. For most of the firms the main 
reasons for selling firm produced heat outside were either traditions or social 
responsibility as the enterprise may be the sole provider of heat for its neighbourhood. 
Furthermore, without the massive physical heritage facilities necessary to produce 
infrasoc goods, and especially its over capacity, it is highly unlikely that firms in Russia 
would be engaged in infrasoc provision in such an extent. Investment costs required by 
infrasoc provision would not be covered by the incomes and benefits they produce.  
 
Secondly, and most importantly, we argue that major part of firms’ infrasoc provision 
relates to firms’ efforts to increase their operational reliability in a highly insecure 
operation environment. With infrasoc participation, firms can tackle three sources of 
uncertainty. First is the physical environment which relates to complementary capital. As 
Table 1 showed, considerable part of firms are experiencing interruptions in basic 
infrastructure supply. Thus, firms try to increase the reliability of local infrastructure 
provision in order to utilize their own capital input to the fullest. Firms try to mend the 
public provision by financial or non-financial support or by producing the infrastructure 
good itself. Second source of insecurity lies within the firm, i.e. labour force. As social 
service production by the state to which it is mandated is of weak quality in Russia, 
workers value its provision by the employer highly. By providing workers with social 
services, the firm is able to attach its staff more strongly and to keep them from shifting to 
another employer and possibly even to induce labour4.  
 
Third source of uncertainty originates in the actions of the local authorities. In their 
analysis of Russian fiscal federalism, Lavrov, Litwack, and Sutherland (2000) argue that 
regions and localities in Russia favour large incumbent firms capable of providing public 
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goods. As cash-constrained regional and local governments must provide traditional 
public goods such as education and health care, as well as heating and road upkeep, local 
administrations have an incentive to cooperate with local enterprises in providing 
statutory public services. Thus there are prerequisites for enterprise-municipal cooperation 
where municipality can secure the fulfilment of its mandates better and extract more 
resources to itself while infrasoc participating firm extracts beneficial treatment from 
municipality authorities.  
 
There is abundant anecdotic evidence of authorities offences towards dissident firms in 
Russia, but on the other hand at least as abundant evidence that good relations to 
authorities makes firm’s daily operations considerably smoother. Thus, we argue that 
firms gain preferential treatment from authorities, if they participate in municipal infrasoc 
provision, but on the other hand face a threat of some sort of sanctions should they 
dissociate themselves from it. This mechanism relates also to the inheritance factor. It 
could be unwise for the firms not to utilize the scale benefits from the production facilities 
they have inherited. Many enterprises use the existing capacity to serve their own need 
and provide the rest to outsiders in exchange for some form of compensation. Social 
assets may also be used to lobby for authorities' help to protect firms from competition as 
shown by Juurikkala and Lazareva (2006a). 
 
3. THEORETICAL MODEL  
In this section, we construct a stylized model grasping some the above mentioned aspects 
of Russian firms’ infrasoc provision. We consider a generalized approach to one presented 
in McKenna (1985, Ch. 4.2.). The firm faces different production breakdown, efficiency 
and delay risks with probability 1 ( , where I is firm’s expenditure in infrastructure 
like roads, regional communication, and energy network etc. S is the unit value of 
expenditure on social and health conditions of workers in the firm. These partly firm 
specific expenditures help the firm to increase its operation efficiency and lower the risk 
of production problems. Thus the probability of good state is an increasing function of 
,q I S− )
                                                                                                                                                  
4 See a thorough discussion in (Juurikkala and Lazareva 2006b). 
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infrastructure and social expenditures, i.e. ( , )q q I S=  with . These are the key 
assumptions of our model. 
, 0S Iq q >
 
We take somewhat unorthodox approach as we consider firm’s maximization problem 
with respect to expected utility instead of expected profit directly. We argue that this 
approach is valid due to following reasons. First, operational risks in Russia are 
considerable and clearly larger concerning both the level of risk and losses. Thus, we are 
able to grasp this uncertainty better than under the standard risk neutrality assumption. 
Secondly, risk neutrality assumption requires perfect capital markets which are well 
known to lack in Russia. Thirdly, the form of firm ownership and its relationship to 
localities matter in firm performance. Thus risk neutrality can not be assumed among the 
firms having a large stake in. To keep the model as simple as possible we consider capital 
input as fixed and concentrate on complementary operating capital which can be thought, 
at least in our case, to affect mainly the probability of the good production state in the 
short run.  However we assume that the firm have some asset incomes R  to cover the 
loses involved with the bad production state.  
 
Next we present the model and give the conditions under which firm’s infrasoc provision 
decreases the breakdown probability. We pay also attention to firm’s risk-aversion and 
implications of uncertainty to firm’s labour demand. Also some wage level effect results 
on  investments are provided.    
 
3.1. The model 
Assume that the firm maximizes expected utility form good and bad states in following in 
way. 
                          1 2
( , , )
{ ( ) ( , ) ( ) (1 ( , )) ( )}
L I S
MAX U q I S U q I S Uπ π π= + −  
where  
 
                              1 ( ( ) ) ( )Q e S L w S L I Rπ = − + − +  
 
                             2 ( )w S L I Rπ = − + − +  
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are the profits in good and bad state ( 1 2 0π π> > ), and R  incomes from other sources. 
 is a typical concave  production function.   is a concave labour input 
efficiency function with argument of firm’s social investments S.  Thus S is measured 
with monetary terms increasing the efficiency of firm’s workers. It can be directly added 
to the cost side of firms operations like the given wage level w. Note also that investment 
in infrastructure, I,  is also measured in monetary terms  -   and added to firm’s costs  -  
but it does not enter in the firm’s production function directly, but only indirectly via the 
expected utility presentation of production uncertainty. This means that investments in I  
does not increases the firm’s production like S but  it increases the probability of  good 
operation state of firm.  
( ( ) )Q e S L ( )e S
 
The maximization problem in details is  
( , , )
{ ( ) ( , ) [ ( ( ) ) ( ) ] (1 ( , )) [ ( ) ]}
L I S
MAX U q I S U Q e S L w S L I R q I S U w S L I Rπ = − + − + + − − + − +  
 
 The first order conditions under assumption that interior maximization solution exists are    
 
     A1)   * ** 1 2| '( )[ ' ( ) ] (1 ) '( )[ ]L L
U qU Q e S w S q U w S 0
L
π π=∂ = − − + − −∂ − = . 
  
    B1)    * * * * ** 1 1 2 2 2| ( ) '( ) ( ) '( ) '( ) 0I I I I
U q U qU q U qU U
I
π π π π π=∂ = − − + −∂ = . 
 
    C1)    * * * * ** 1 1 2 2 2| ( ) '( )[ ' ' ] ( ) '( ) '( ) 0S S S S
U q U qU Q e L L q U qU L U L
S
π π π π π=∂ = + − − + −∂ = . 
 
The conditions imply that  
 
         A2)         
* * *
1 2 1[ ][ '( ) (1 ) '( )] '( ) ' ( )w S qU q U qU Q e Sπ π π+ + − =
⇒
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*
1
* *
1 2
( , ) '( ) ( )
'( ( ) *)
( , ) '( ) (1 ( , )) '( )
q I S U e Sw S Q e S L
q I S U q I S U
π
π π+ = + − . 
 
       B2)        
* * * * *
1 2 1 2 2( ) ( ) '( ) '( ) '( ) 0I Iq U q U qU qU Uπ π π π π− − + −
⇒
=
                    
* *1
1 2( *, )
* *
1 2
'( ) (1 ) '( )( *, )
( *, ) ( ) ( )
q I SI
U Uq I S
q I S U U
π π
π π
⎡ ⎤− −= ⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
 
       C2)        
* * * * *
1 2 1 2 2( ) ( ) '( )[ ' ' ] '( ) '( ) 0S Sq U q U qU Q e L L qU L U Lπ π π π π− + − + − =
⇒
                    
* *1
1 2( , *)
* *
1 2
'( )( ' ' 1) (1 ) '( )( , *)
( , *) ( ) ( )
q I SS
U Q e Uq I S
L
q I S U U
π π
π π
⎡ ⎤− − − −= ⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
 
 
3.2. Implications of results 
Condition A2) says the firm’s optimal wage level for the labour input is less than the level 
of its contribution to output  since  
*
1
* *
1 2
( , ) '( ) ( )
0 1
( , ) '( ) (1 ( , )) '( )
q I S U e S
q I S U q I S U
π
π π< <+ −  if ( ) 1e S ≤ . 
As the firm pays social and health costs of its workers, the optimal wage level is still 
down pressed   
 
        A3)           
*
1
* *
1 2
( , ) '( ) ( )
* '( ( ) *)
( , ) '( ) (1 ( , )) '( )
q I S U e Sw w Q e S L S
q I S U q I S U
π
π π> = −+ − . 
 
However the low wage level increases labour demand but typically the level of 
employment under product uncertainty is less than in the case of certainty, since  (for 
details, see Appendix I)   
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* * *
1 2 1
* 2 * *
1 1 2
[ '( ) ' ( ) [ '( ) '( )]( )]* 0
''( )( ' ( ) ) '( ) '' ( ) (1 ) ''( )( )
U Q e S U U w SdL
dq qU Q e S w S qU Q e S q U w S
π π π
π π π
− + − += >− − + + − − − 2 . 
 
Note that under risk neutrality  ( * *2 1'( ) '( ) 0U Uπ π− = ) we still have * 0dLdq > . 
 
Condition B2) can easily be transformed to elasticity presentation  
 
      B3)                       
* *1
1 2( *, )
* * *
1 2
'( ) (1 ) '( )( *, ) *
*
( *, ) ( ) ( )
q I SI
qI
U Uq I S I I
q I S U U
π πε π π
⎡ ⎤− −= = ⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
 
The sign of *qIε  is always positive since the numerator is always positive as    
 
                                          * *11 2( *, )'( ) 0 (1 ) '( )q I SU Uπ π> ≥ − .  
 
This happens naturally when the risk of production breakdown is high, i.e.  is close 
to zero. Note also that under risk-neutrality the result is valid.  
( , )q I S
 
Lastly, condition C2) can also be given an elasticity interpretation  
 
    C(3)                 
* *1
1 2( , *)
* * *
1 2
'( )( ' ' 1) (1 ) '( )( , *) *
* .
( , *) ( ) ( )
q I SS
qS
U Q e Uq I S S
S L
q I S U U
π πε π π
⎡ ⎤− − − −= = ⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
 
The sign of *qSε  depends on sign of * *11 2( , *)'( )( ' ' 1) (1 ) '( )q I SU Q e Uπ π− − − − . The increase of 
social and health expenditures of a firm will decrease the probability of production 
breakdown, i.e. *qSε >0,  if  
 
                                           
1
* *
2 1
1
0 '( )
1 ' '
q U U
Q e
'( )π π−⎡ ⎤< ≤⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
. 
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The sign of numerator is always negative and obtains a larger (negative) value when q is 
close to zero. With respect to this the firm values highly the large efficiency and 
production gains from social and health expenditures, i.e. . Typically in post-
communist firms marginal productivity of labour input   is low ( 0
' ' 1Q e >
'Q 'Q 1< < ) but labour 
input efficiency gains can still be high ( ) making their product to be larger than one.  
Note that case 
' 1e >
' ' 1Q e <  means that production and efficiency gains of social investments 
in labour input are at low level. Either the investments are at too low level or they are 
excess making the expenditure in them even harm causing ( qSε <0). Note that there can be 
many different threshold levels of   that make their product  larger than 
one.  It is expected that in different firms their combination also varies. In many cases 
production technology is harder to adjust than labour input efficiency.    
'   and  'Q e ' 'Q e
 
In risk neutral case, the qSε  > 0 condition is 1 ' 'q Q e= .  Comparing this to risk aversion 
case we observe 1(1 ) /(1 ' ') 1q Q e− − >  ratio allows even for *1'( ) '( )U U *2π π>  case 
indicating the importance of marginal utility of good state for the firm.  Note also that 
there exists a “trade off” between 1(1 )  and (1 ' ')q Q e− − . When the probability of good 
state is evident, that is ,  productivity gains from  S  can be low, .  1q → ' ' 1Q e →
 
To sum-up we observe that positive non-breakdown condition ( qIε >0) for infrastructure 
investments is always valid, but cases exist when expenditures in social and health care 
are non optimal. Evidently I and S have different roles in the firm. Due the complex model 
setting the sign of wage change effects on investments (  are 
ambiguous (see Appendix II). Only when the firm is risk neutral the increase in wage 
level  decreases infrastructure and social investments, i.e. 
/   and  / )dS dw dI dw
/ 0  and  / 0dI dw dS dw< < .     
 
4. DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY  
Survey data used in this paper comes from a firm survey conducted among large Russian 
industrial enterprises in April-June 2003. The survey was organized by a joint research 
team of Helsinki School of Economics, Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in 
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Transition (BOFIT), and the Centre for Financial and Economic Research (CEFIR) in 
Moscow. The survey focused on enterprises' role in providing social services and 
infrastructure. The survey, therefore, includes many questions on firm's involvement in 
the provision of a wide variety of social services, assessments of public infrastructure 
items, generation of heat and electricity as well as regulation and competition. In contrast, 
detailed balance sheet data was not collected. Firm performance indicators and 
employment figures were obtained from Gnosis data base. 
 
The survey covered 404 large and medium-sized industrial enterprises in 40 regions in 
Russia. Apart from energy production and minerals extraction which were excluded, the 
sample is representative of industrial distribution (in 2-digit level) in Russia. The majority 
of firms in the sample employ between 500 and 5000 employees. For a thorough 
discussion of the survey design and implementation see Haaparanta et al. (2003). Our 
empirical methods consists of OLS and Probit regressions. Descriptions and descriptive 
statistics of main variables used can be found in the Appendix III. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
In this section, we will present our empirical evidence. Although our data does not allow 
to test our model directly, we are able to get a sense on how the data is in line with the 
model’s features. We will start off with firm performance analysis to see how the firm’s 
infrasoc activity is reflected into its performance. We are using common explanatory 
variables from performance literature coupled with our unique survey variables on firms’ 
infrasoc participation. After the performance analysis we will turn our attention to the 
three channels of firm’s infrasoc participation in enhancing firm’s operational reliability. 
 
5.1. Firm performance and infrasoc participation 
Our model above suggested that the elasticity of good state probability with respect to 
infrastructure expenditures is positive but with respect to social expenditures the positive 
elasticity is not warranted. Now, if our model assumptions are correct, we would expect 
that higher infrastructure expenditures reflect into higher profits in real life data. This 
leads us to performance analysis. In this section, we will present the results from our 
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simple performance regressions where our focus is on the infrasoc variables. As we are 
here mostly interested in infrasoc variables, we do not go in details into the standard 
performance analysis.  
 
There are other quite recent papers building on firm survey evidence from Russia but this 
literature has paid little attention to the question of social services and infrastructure. 
Brown and Earle (2000) use a measure of regional (subject of Russian Federation) 
transport infrastructure quality and find clear positive effect of its better quality on total 
factor productivity. Concerning developing countries, apart from the World Development 
Report, the role of infrastructure on firm level performance has been examined e.g. by 
Reinikka and Svensson (2002)5. A theoretical paper by Röller and Zhang (2005) 
envisages a transition country framework and examines how an exogenously given 
requirement to bundle social services to employee compensation may harm efficiency via 
soft budget constraints. In contrast to Röller and Zhang, we examine the case where firms 
endogenously choose to provide social services.  
 
In this context use profit per employee (eprofit) as the dependent variable which is a 
measure of productivity. One percent of performance variable’s tails is removed to 
exclude the most evident outliers. In the Russian case this is virtually a necessity due to 
major discrepancies between the firms. Table 10 in the Appendix IV gives results of 
similar performance analysis when using sales per employee as the dependent variable.  
Our main results are not altered. The standard control variables6 we are using are capital, 
finance, internationality, geographical location, size of municipality (1000 inhabitants), 
market power, ownership7 and industry. We proxy the level of capital with a dummy 
variable (invest) indicating whether the firm carried out major investments during 2000-
2002. Internationality of a firm is measured as the percentage of firm sales exported in 
                                                 
5 Reinikka and Svensson (2002) show that poor public infrastructure, as proxied by unreliable and in-
adequate electricity supply, significantly reduces private investment. For Russia see e.g. http://www. 
moscowtimes.ru/article/1009/42/368028.htm 
6 For example, Carlin et al (2001) use similar set of variables. 
7 A dummy was constructed for the largest shareholder (insiders, private, state, foreign, other). The category 
‘insiders’ includes employers and managers and the category ‘private’ includes both private individuals and 
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2002. Financing situation of a firm is proxied with the interest rate it would have to pay 
for a short term bank loan.  
 
To stay in focus, we do not report or discuss three control dummies (industry, location and 
market power) although they are included in the regressions. We also tested for another 
standard variable, tightness of competition (proxied by firms’ view on the number of 
serious rivals) - both domestic and foreign, but found it systematically insignificant and it 
is thus omitted from the reported regressions. However, we include - though not explicitly 
report – a dummy for firm’s market power which is another variable proxying the firm’s 
competition environment8. Soft budget constraints (proxied by any sort of financial 
assistance from the state) were left out from our reported regressions as we did not find 
any significant effect on performance for it. 
 
Our results suggest (see Table 6 on page 21) that private and state owned firms perform 
worse than the insider owned firms (benchmark dummy) on the average. This result 
somewhat contradicts Estrin and Angelucci (2003) who were not able to find clear 
performance differences between insider and outsider owned firms. Furthermore, also 
Djankov and Murrell (2002) find that there is no notable difference in the performance 
between insider and outsider owned firms while both perform clearly better than the state 
owned firms in the CIS countries. There are at least two major technical differences that 
might be causing the discrepancy between our results and the above two studies 
concerning insider versus outsider owned firm performance. First of all, our measure of 
ownership (majority shareholder) differs from the Estrin and Angelucci (ibid.) who use 
majority ownership and from Djankov and Murrell (ibid.) who have derived their 
synthesis results from studies that mostly use continuous ownership variables measured in 
percent of ownership. Secondly, the time scope of these studies is mostly prior to the 
                                                                                                                                                  
private Russian companies. The category ‘state’ includes all three levels of government in Russia. Large 
Russian firms are typically controlled by a single type of owner. 
8 Following Carlin et al. (2001), our market power dummy is based on firm’s own view on how much its 
sales would decline if it would unilaterally increase its main products’ prices by ten percents. Carlin et al. 
found that market power has some positive effect on sales and productivity growth but a negative effect on 
cost-reducing restructuring. While our results of market power on profit per employee were insignificant, 
we found a negative effect on sales per employee (see Table 10 in the Appendix IV). 
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Russian 1998 financial crisis. The crisis might have wiped out the worst performing 
insider owned firms thus excluding them from our survey sample gathered in 20039.  
 
Our proxy for the level of capital fails to show significance. Financial constraints of the 
firm has the expected sign and it is highly significant. Riskier firms in banks’ view, i.e. 
those who have to pay higher interest for loans, perform worse. Naturally, the direction of 
causality is ambiguous but this result could relate to the importance of financial 
constraints suggested by Estrin and Bevan (2003). Furthermore, larger size of 
municipality seems to serve firms performance better. Finally, we find evidence that the 
larger the share of exports in firm sales, the better it is performing.  
 
Concerning our unique infrasoc variables, we have four different explanatory infrasoc 
variables each depicting somewhat different aspect of the phenomenon. First, as a variable 
reflecting firm’s own infrastructure production, we have a dummy (elec_prod) with value 
of one if the firm produced its own electricity in 2002 and zero otherwise. Secondly, we 
have the variable (railsup) capturing the feature of firm’s support to municipal 
infrastructure supply. The variable is coded as one, if firm provided any financial or non-
financial support to municipal railway system in 2002, zero if none. Thirdly, to analyze 
social service provision we have the dummy variable (house02) coded as one if firm 
provided housing or financed housing of its workers in 2002. Finally, we test the effect of 
problems in infrastructure delivery on performance. This is controlled with a variable 
depicting the number of interruption days in municipal heat delivery experienced by the 
firm in 2002.  
 
According to our results it seems that while production and support of infrastructure is 
positively connected to performance10, social service provision to employees seems to be 
a burden. The coefficient on housing provision is negative. The coefficients are positive 
for railway support and electricity production when regressing on profit per employee in 
                                                 
9 Estrin and Angelucci (ibid.) explicitly note that the 1998 crisis is likely to distort many variables they use. 
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2002. The coefficients of these three infrasoc dummies are quite large taking into account 
that the mean of profit per employee is 18.9. We also find strong evidence on negative 
effect of infrastructure interruptions on performance. Furthermore, we find evidence that 
interruptions experienced in electricity delivery have a negative effect on performance 
(see Table 10 in the Appendix IV). 
 
Naturally, a potential bias arises in OLS estimates as infrastructure supply and perfor-
mance are determined simultaneously. We are able to partly alleviate this endogeneity 
problem by running regressions with the same independent variables with 2003 
performance figures. The main results remain unchanged. With infrasoc variables the 
results concerning infrastructure reappear with even larger coefficients but the housing 
provision variable becomes insignificant.  
 
How do these results then coincide with our model implications? First, our model suggests 
unambiguously positive elasticity for the good state probability on infrastructure 
expenditures. Our clearly positive results of infrastructure expenditures on both 2002 and 
2003 clearly support this feature of the model. In our model, positive elasticity for q with 
social expenditures would require quite strong condition (Q’e’>1, see page 14). We 
interpret our empirical results so that this condition is not satisfied as marginal 
productivity in Russia is low and efficiency gains from social expenditures are too small 
to reverse their product to be above one. Why are the firms then continuing to provide 
social services? One explanation could be that stopping social service provision would 
probably result in mass leave of workers from the firm as well as worsen firm's relations 
with the authorities. Thus, firms might be somehow locked up in “bad equilibrium” 
generated by the Russian social and institutional conditions.  
 
5.2. Operation reliability: participation in infrastructure provision 
As our model suggests, firms are interested in their expected profits. When they are 
choosing infrastructure participation, they only know that this affects positively the 
                                                                                                                                                  
10 This result is in line with Brown and Earle (2000)  in the sense that firms acknowledge the importance of 
functioning transport infrastructure to their performance and are thus willing to participate in its supply.  
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probability of no delivery disturbances and thus better profit. It would be tempting to find 
out whether participation in infrastructure provision diminishes interruptions, but cross 
sectional data do not allow to test this as there is most likely a lag in the effectiveness.  
 
Based on the performance analysis of the previous sub-section the interruptions in 
municipal infrastructure provision affect firm performance negatively. However we will 
show that  interruptions in municipal infrastructure provision affect firms' participation in 
investments positively. As firms realize the negative effect of interruptions into their daily 
operation, they react by increasing their participation in infrastructure provision  in order 
to improve their own operation reliability. Participation in heat provision is the most 
widespread way of private infrastructure provision, and therefore we will first concentrate 
on it.  
 
The column three in the Table 6 (on next page) reports the results of a Probit regression of 
firm’s support to municipal heat supply. The dependent variable (heatsup) is constructed 
from the survey data so that it is coded one if the firm provided financial or non-financial 
support to municipal heat supply in 2002. Results show that heat interruptions have a 
positive effect on supporting municipal heat provision. Increase of ten interruption days in 
heat delivery increases the probability of supporting municipal heat delivery by four 
percents on the average. Furthermore, interruptions experienced in water delivery increase 
the probability of firm supporting it by approximately a percent per interruption day (see 
Table 10 in the Appendix IV). 
 
Concerning control variables for heat delivery support, interesting result is that 
municipality size (coded in thousands) seems to decrease the probability of support. This 
is probably related to the fact that larger cities are generally older and their infrastructure 
systems were influenced less by the consequences of Soviet planning. Secondly, state and 
foreign majority ownership seem to increase considerably the probability of heat and 
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                               Table 6. Infrasoc variables and performancea 
 
 
OLS Probitb
 eprofit02 eprofit03 Heatsup 
Elec_prod 54.75 73.13  
 (2.38)** (2.05)**  
Railsup 28.42 37.91  
 (2.16)** (2.34)**  
House02 -10.62 2.67  
 (-2.02)** (0.26)  
Heat interruption days -0.55 -1.97 0.004 
 (-1.89)* (-5.46)*** (2.22)** 
LNemp02   -0.036 
   (-0.76) 
LNsales02   0.059 
   (1.88)* 
Invest 0.88 12.56 -0.050 
 (0.12) (1.16) (-0.68) 
Interest -2.06 -3.84 0.009 
 (-2.90)*** (-3.51)*** (1.72)* 
Population 0.0032 -0.0013 -0.0002 
 (1.86)* (-0.54) (-2.21)** 
Export02 0.31 0.43 0.0001 
 (1.75)* (1.78)* (0.11) 
Owner (insiders as the 
omitted category)    
Owner: Private -19.48 -23.31 -0.006 
 (-2.93)*** (-2.46)** (-0.11) 
Owner: State -18.16 -38.00 0.210 
 (-2.00)** (-2.34)** (2.12)** 
Owner: Foreign -26.04 -39.77 (dropped) 
 (-1.11) (-1.89)*  
Owner: Other -22.57 -30.91 -0.025 
 (-2.31)** (-2.34)** (-0.31) 
Constant 33.15 93.34  
 (1.21) (2.05)**  
No. of observations 229 229 188 
Prob > F / Chi2 0.0002 0.000 0.048 
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.32 0.30 0.20 
a. t- and z-values for OLS and probit in parantheses, heteroskedasticity  
robust standard errors used in all regressions. Federal District, industry  
and market power dummies included in all regressions but not reported.  
b. Results concerning the probit regression are reported in average marginal 
 effects on Prob(y=1) and their z-values. Marginal effects were obtained 
 through Stata’s “margeff” module. 
***Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% level, *Significant at 10% level. 
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water delivery support, respectively. We also found some supporting results concerning 
gas delivery but they are left unreported due to rather high sensitivity to control variables. 
 
5.3. Operation reliability: participation in social service provision  
Our model indicates that also social services affect positively the probability of a good 
state, i.e.  This can be justified e.g. through better worker health. Furthermore, if 
social service provision is weak from the authorities’ side, enterprises may use social 
service provision as an attachment tool. Thus, service provision is an operation reliability 
enhancer as it helps to retain the labour force in the firm. Stopping the provision might 
result in a mass labour shift from the firm, especially in locations where labor market is 
tight.  
0.Sq >
 
Juurikkala and Lazareva (2006b) obtained a result supporting our operational reliability 
argument. They show that firms use social services as non-wage benefits to employees in 
tight labour markets in order to increase labour attachment and thus decrease labour 
turnover. Improved labour attachment increases productivity and decreases labour costs as 
the money and time costs from replacing resigned workers diminish. This rationale for 
social service provision is a part of Russia firms’ infrasoc provision that is also quite 
standard practise in advanced capitalist countries. Further, Juurikkala and Lazareva (ibid.) 
show that the strongest effect in labour turnover reduction concerns the blue collar 
workers and that improved access to local service provision diminishes the share of non-
wage benefits. 
 
We will test the effect of the magnitude of a firm's social service provision on labor 
turnover if a firm ceased to provide social services with an ordered probit regression 
where the dependent variable is considered as a proxy for  in our model. Ordered probit 
model considers a dependent variable for which the discrete responses are presented in 
order with quantitative interpretation (see e.g. Wooldridge, 2002). We constructed the 
dependent variable from the following survey question (distribution of the 399 answers in 
parentheses): 
Sq
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IF YOU STOP PROVIDING YOUR EMPLOYEES WITH ALL SOCIAL SERVICES, KEEPING TO THE 
SAME SALARY LEVEL, HOW MANY EMPLOYEES APPROXIMATELY WOULD LEAVE YOUR FIRM?  
 
1. None (203=51%) 
2. Less than 10% (123=31%) 
3. 10-20% (44=11%) 
4. 20-30 % (15=4%) 
5. 30-50% (10=2%) 
6. More than 50% (4=1%) 
 
Half of the sample firms expect to lose workers if they simply divested all of their 
social service provision. For almost a fifth of the firms, the staff loss would be more 
than ten percent which is likely to cause some problems for firm operations. In the 
ordered probit model the independent variable of most interest is the total rouble book 
value of social service facilities divided by sales in 2002 (allsocial_persales). Our 
results give a strong positive coefficient to this aggregated social service variable.  
 
Table 7 shows the regression results along with marginal effects and their p-values for 
the social service magnitude variable. One unit increase in the social service facilities 
per sales would increase the probability of 10-20% of the labour force leaving the  
 
Table 7. Ordered probit regression on testing social service provision for 
               operation reliability 
 
Ordered probit on Labour 
leave after divestmenta Marginal effects and P-values of variable coefficients
b
  Answer 1 Answer 2 Answer 3 Answer 4 Answer 5 Answer 6 
Allsocial_persales 0.383   -0.135 0.048 0.052 0.015 0.014 0.007 
 (2.14)**    0.013 0.025 0.016 0.064 0.069 0.156 
LNemp02 -0.005       
 (-0.03)       
LNsales02 0.027 Observations 248     
 (0.27) Pseudo R2 0.04     
LNpopulation 0.073 Prob > Chi2 0.06     
 (1.03)       
a. z-values in parentheses. Dummies for ownership, Federal district and industry included but not 
reported. 
b. Marginal effects and P-values obtained with Stata’s “meoprobit” module by Cornelissen (2006), 
reported only for allsocial_persales variable as others turned out insignificant. 
 
 
 23
enterprise after divestment by approximately five percents (answer 3). At the same time, it 
would decrease the probability of no mass leave by approximately fourteen percents 
(answer 1). Thus, with higher level of social service provision, the firm is able to retain 
larger labour force. Thus, this result gives some support to our model’s assumption that 
social service provision should be viewed also as firm’s means to increase operation 
reliability via keeping hold of its staff.  
 
5.4. Operation reliability: relations with the public sector 
Above we have shown evidence that firms use infrasoc participation as means to increase 
operational reliability via more reliable infrastructure delivery and labour attachment.  The 
third channel for increasing operational reliability is related to coping with the authority 
risk. By authority risk we mean all arbitrary and potentially harmful activity that 
authorities may exercise over enterprises. In an environment characterised by insecure 
property rights, rigid rules with large possibilities for interpretation and poorly functioning 
juridiciary a local bureaucrat may either greatly facilitate or greatly harm private business 
operations.  
 
On the other hand, in such an environment a poor local administration may easily be 
captured by private interests. As our survey results show, infrastructure-providing 
enterprises are on  the average larger than other enterprises. And, especially in a transition 
economy, size tends to come with connections and influence. An influential firm would 
typically be a large firm, employing a large share of the local population and consequently 
affecting directly the local wellbeing and political mood.  An influential firm has good 
opportunities to engage in what Frye (2002) describes as elite exchange: enterprises which 
receive favourable treatment also provide some benefits to state agents.  
 
There are several possible reasons for the public sector to be interested in cooperation 
with enterprises in the provision of public goods and complementary capital. The self-
evident reason is of course that the local public sector in Russia has very little money 
available for new investments, and it is in everyone's interest to use existing capacity 
whenever possible. Even if a municipality could manage public infrastructure without the 
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help of local enterprises, maintaining close relations probably enables local politicians to 
obtain some private benefits.  
 
The mismatch between considerable expenditure requirements and the lack of own 
revenues at the regional level also results in peculiar forms of public goods provision. In 
their analysis of Russian fiscal federalism, Lavrov, Litwack, and Sutherland (2000) argue 
that regions and localities in Russia favour large incumbent firms capable of providing 
public goods. As cash-constrained regional and local governments must provide 
traditional public goods such as education and health care, as well as heating and road 
upkeep, local administrations have an incentive to cooperate with local enterprises in 
providing statutory public services. 
 
One channel for informal budget operations is to have large firms contribute directly to 
the provision of some public services such as road maintenance or health care. In 
exchange, regional governments may tolerate large tax arrears with no expectation of ever 
being paid. At the regional level, everyone is happy, i.e. firms roughly pay in some form 
most of the taxes they would otherwise have to pay, consumers get better public services, 
and regional leaders have independent discretion over budget operations. The obvious 
loser is the federal government, which is effectively deprived of its share of tax revenue, 
(see also Haaparanta and Juurikkala 2004). Frye (2002) offers survey evidence that the 
economic playing field in Russia is tilted in favour of large enterprises (which typically 
provide infrasoc goods) and against smaller de novo firms, especially at the regional level. 
 
There is evidence that firms engaged in infrasoc provision have been able to extract 
favours from the local government. First of all, Juurikkala and Lazareva (2006a) show 
that enterprises have been able to use their social assets as leverage to extract benefits 
from the local public sector. Juurikkala and Lazareva (ibid.) find that firms which divested 
their social assets later received more financial benefits from the local authorities, 
especially in poor localities. They also find that firms operating in tighter competition 
situation divested later, suggesting that social assets are used to lobby for authorities' help 
to protect firms from competition. Also Solanko (2006) found evidence that firms 
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involved in heat provision were more likely to receive financial benefits from the 
authorities. We refer to these results as an evidence for the third channel of increasing 
operational reliability, i.e. increasing the probability of the good state via a combination of 
infrasoc provision and public relations. 
 
Our survey data allows us to directly test ability to affect authorities’ decision making, i.e. 
state capture. We constructed a dummy variable getting value one, if the general manager 
estimated his enterprise having any influence on local/regional decision making. A simple 
Probit regression was used to test for determinants of firms’ ability to capture the 
local/regional administration. The results reported in the first two columns of the Table 8 
suggest that participation in infrasoc provision enhances the firms’ chances to influence 
public decision-making. As expected, larger enterprises in smaller jurisdictions have 
higher probability of influencing activities by local/regional authorities. Ownership does 
not seem to be a decisive factor. Compared to insider owned enterprises, only foreign 
owned firms differ in having significantly smaller probability to affect authorities. But 
clearly, enterprises supporting municipal heating systems have significantly higher 
probability to have an effect on local/regional decision making.  
 
Therefore, engagement in infrasoc provision helps enterprises to maintain good relations 
with the local administration and to extract benefits from it. But as expected, the local 
administrations are not passive but rather they have every incentive to ensure continuity of 
firms’ infrasoc provision. The survey data offer us an indirect measure to proxy for 
administration's bargaining power. We are able to construct dummy variables on the 
expected consequences after hypothetical infrasoc divestment. Thus, worse_heat has an 
outcome of one if general manager thinks their relations with local authorities would 
worsen and/or firm’s taxes unrelated to heating system would increase if firm divested 
from the heating boilers. Variable worse_medic is constructed similarly for medical 
facilities divestment. We use these variables as additional explanatory variables to explain 
firms’ infrasoc provision. 
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                    Table 8.  Infra-social participation and public relations 
PROBITa munic_capture regio_capture Heat prov Medic facil 
LNpopulation -0.048 -0.034 -0.080 -0.006 
 (-1.67)* (-1.24) (-3.25)*** (-0.17) 
LNemp02 0.106 0.065 0.089 -0.015 
 (1.70)* (1.05) (1.49) (-0.19) 
LNsales02 0.028 0.044 -0.008 0.063 
 (0.66) (1.09) (-0.21) (1.13) 
Invest -0.072 -0.051 0.071 0.023 
 (-0.82) (-0.62) (0.85) (0.23) 
Owner: Private -0.023 0.087 0.126 0.110 
 (-0.33) (1.25) (1.88)* (1.32) 
Owner: State -0.130 0.065 0.063 0.018 
 (-1.21) (0.58) (0.61) (0.14) 
Owner: Foreign -0.240 -0.030 -0.151 0.098 
 (-2.09)** (-0.23) (-1.49) (0.58) 
Owner: Other 0.045 0.130 0.216 0.432 
 (0.27) (0.83) (1.95)* (4.73)*** 
Heat support 0.164 0.210   
 (1.75)* (2.18)**   
Heat_pre90   0.263  
   (3.07)***  
Worse_heat   0.137  
   (2.17)**  
Medic_pre90    -0.056 
    (-0.53) 
Worse_medic    0.189 
    (2.25)** 
     
Prob > Chi2 0.04 0.02 0.000 0.03 
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.12 0.36 0. 19 
No. of observations 237 239 175 158 
           a. Probit regression results are reported in average marginal effects on Prob(y=1) and with 
           their z-values. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors used. Federal district, industry 
           and market power dummies included but not reported. 
 
 
In the case of heat provision, we use heat provision to outsiders as the dependent dummy 
variable while the independent medical variable is a dummy for a positive book value of 
medical facilities. The results are given in the columns three and four of Table 8. 
Regressions show that if firm expects worse authority relations after hypothesized 
divestment from heat provision, it is fourteen percent more probable to provide it than a 
firm that do not perceive this threat. For medical service provision the effect is some 
nineteen percents. Thus, the threat of worsening authority relations seems to be partly 
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keeping the current system in operation. Besides staff leave, the authority risk might be 
another reason for firms’ locking up in bad equilibrium of producing non-profitable social 
services. The results are in line with Solanko (2006) who shows that heat provision by 
Russian enterprises is largely explained by relations with the local public sector and by 
inherited factors. The inheritance factor is also addressed in Table 8 through dummy 
variables coded as one if firm had heating boilers and medical facilities already in the 
socialist time (heat_pre90 and medic_pre90). Interestingly, while heat provision is 
strongly explained by inheritance the medical provision is not, probably reflecting the 
smaller capital intensity of medical provision. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The practice of firms’ participation in infrastructure and social service provision was 
initiated under the Soviet Union regime but it is still visible in current Russia despite the 
end of the socialist regime almost twenty years ago. Utilizing a theoretical model and a 
unique survey data from large Russian enterprises, the main target of  paper was to grasp 
the rationality behind this activity for the firms that nowadays operate in market driven 
economy. The main idea of our model is to explain the firms’ infrasoc participation 
through the argument that via infrasoc participation the firm is able enhance its operation 
reliability. 
 
Based on earlier related studies as well as our new results, we are inclined to believe that 
the complex system of Russian firms’ infrasoc provision can be largely reduced to two 
factors. The first one - physical and social/institutional inheritance - is exogenous in 
nature. While institutional practices linger on in the background, the costs of infrasoc 
participation are considerably cheaper with inherited capital and even outside provision is 
rational also for small compensation. The second rationale is the one introduced in our 
model, i.e. firm’s effort to increase its operational reliability. This factor materializes 
through various channels. With infrasoc participation firms try to improve the  reliability 
of municipal infrastructure delivery to secure smooth production, to increase the 
commitment level of employees in order to prevent staff loss, and aim at better public 
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relations in order to gain more friendly regulatory atmosphere. Our survey data gives 
empirical support to all these features. 
 
The firm provision of infrasoc goods is likely to continue as long as public sector is 
unable to carry out its mandates, Russian institutions remain weak, and facilities inherited 
by firms from the Soviet times are usable. Should these results be taken as good or bad 
news for a developing economy? The resulting equilibrium will unavoidably be one 
characterised by close relations between the local public sector and large industrial 
enterprises. Even though that may be efficient in the short term, it will certainly hinder the 
growth of SMEs and new start-ups in the industrial sector. This may result in less 
competition and possibly less efficiency in the longer term. On the other hand, currently 
Russian public sector is still in such a poor condition that without firms’ participation, 
many citizens might be deprived of their daily necessities taken as granted in more 
advanced capitalist countries.   
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Appendix I 
 
Applying implicit theorem to condition A1) holding I  and S  fixed gives  
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Collecting terms dL  and dq on left and on right hand side of equation leads to   
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and dividing on both sides entails that   
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Numerator is negative since . Denominator is also 
negative since functions are concave, thus   
* *
2 1 2 1  and   [ '( ) '( )] 0U Uπ π π π< −
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Appendix II 
 
Differentiating first order condition B1) with respect to w  and I = I*  gives                    
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Collecting terms for dw on right hand side and for dI on left hand side of the equation 
leads to  
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If the firm is close to risk neutral agent, i.e. '' 0U ≈ , then / 0dI dw <  if   0.IIq >
 
Differentiating first order condition C1) with respect to S = S*  and  w gives  
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Collecting terms for dw on right hand side and for dS  on left hand side of equation leads 
to  
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If firm acts close to risk neutral agent, i.e. '' 0U ≈ , then / 0dS dw < ,  if  
.  
0,SSq >
'' 0,   and  '' 0Q e< <
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Appendix III 
 
                                 Table 9.  Description of main variables 
Dependent variablesa      
 Description Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
eprofit02 Profit per employee in 2002 359 18.87 47.47 -83.95 274.96 
eprofit03 Profit per employee in 2003 359 19.83 65.16 -
139.89 
490.31 
esales02 Sales per employee in 2002 376 318.78 266.85 3.90 1527.80 
esales03 Sales per employee in 2003 369 435.59 418.84 15.28 2580.20 
munic_capture 375 0.44 0.50 0 1 
regio_capture 
Dummy=1if firm admits to have ability to 
influence relevant local / regional 
legislation  
386 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Heat prov Dummy=1if firm provides heat to 
outsiders 
404 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Heat support Dummy=1 if firm provided non- or 
financial support to municipal heating 
system 
403 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Medic facil Dummy=1 if firm has medical facilities in 
its books 
341 0.34 0.48 0 1 
 
 
Independent variables 
     
 Description Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
LNemp02 Log of employment in 2002 390 6.82 0.92 1.79 10.50 
LNsales02 Log of sales in 2003 375 12.24 1.32 7.90 16.13 
Population Population of firm's municipality in 1000s 401 1239.77 2265.88 15.6 8304.6 
Invest Dummy=1 if firm has had major capital 
investments in 2000-2002 
402 0.82 0.38 0 1 
Interest Estimated annual interest firm would 
have to pay for a short term bank loan 
333 20.19 4.46 0 39 
Export02 Share of exports of all sales in 2002, in 
% 
399 11.29 20.73 0 100 
Elec_prod Dummy=1 if firm produces electricity 404 0.04 0.21 0 1 
Railsup Dummy=1 if firm provided non- or 
financial support to municipal railway 
system 
403 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Heat_pre90 Dummy=1 if firm had heating boilers 
already in Soviet times 
403 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Heat interr. days Number of interruption days in municipal 
heat supply to firm 
399 1.16 6.48 0 90 
Worse_heat Dummy=1 if manager believes heat 
divestment --> worse relations and/or 
higher taxes 
276 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Allsocial_persales Book value of all social services in 2002 
divided by sales 
362 0.09 0.52 0 7.03 
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House02 Dummy=1 if firm owned or supported 
staff housing in 2002 
404 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Medic_pre90 Dummy=1 if firm had medical facilities 
already in Soviet times 
403 0.77 0.42 0 1 
Worse_medic Dummy=1 if manager believes medical 
divestment --> worse relations and/or 
higher taxes 
301 0.19 0.40 0 1 
a. Note that heatprov and heatsup are also used as independent variables 
 
 
 
Appendix IV    
                   Table 10.  Additional results on infrasoc and performance 
 
OLS Probitb
 esales02 esales03 watersup 
Elec_prod 175.72 375.68  
 (1.49) (2.24)**  
Railsup 165.45 271.42  
 (2.39)** (2.85)***  
House02 -63.36 -68.97  
 (-2.08)** (-1.31)  
Electricity interruption days -2.68 -4.18  
 (-2.92)*** (-3.43)***  
Water interruption daysa 0.011 
 (2.92)*** 
LNemp02 0.010 
 (0.18) 
LNsales02 0.024 
 (0.69) 
Invest 53.85 61.25 -0.055 
 (1.55) (0.91) (-0.78) 
Interest -14.65 -28.54 0.004 
 (-3.88)*** (-5.04)*** (0.67) 
Population 0.01 0.005 -0.00003 
 (1.21) (0.32) (-1.74)* 
Export02 1.09 1.55 -0.002 
 (1.06) (1.09) (-1.23) 
Owner (insiders as the omitted category)  
  Owner: Private -71.67 -42.49 -0.012 
 (-2.29)** (-0.80) (-0.24) 
  Owner: State -128.01 -213.95 0.119 
 (-2.19)** (-3.36)*** (1.07) 
  Owner: Foreign 65.24 7.14 0.485 
 (0.51) (0.05) (2.91)*** 
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  Owner: Other -75.04 -109.67 -0.101 
 (-1.75)* (-1.57)** (-1.92)* 
 
Market Power (sales drop >10% after 
unilateral 10% increase in prices as 
omitted category) 
 
 
  Market Power: sales drop =10% 13.04 -10.18 -0.013 
 (0.29) (-0.15) (-0.19) 
  Market Power: sales drop <10% -87.55 -190.18 0.084 
 (-1.91)* (-2.48)** (1.06) 
  Market Power: no sales drop  -104.78 -191.09 0.065 
 (-2.97)*** (-3.60)*** (0.77) 
Constant 438.50 840.24  
 (3.69)*** (4.62)***  
No. of observations 236 231 184 
Prob > F / Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.002 
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.41 0.43 0.28 
a. Water interruptions omitted from the performance analysis as it turned out insignificant 
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